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This book does not have the broad sweep suggested by its ambitious
title. It deals with the duty to bargain in good faith imposed on employers by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The author,
an economist, deals with staples of legal discussion: the antecedents of
section 8(5)1 of the Wagner Act, the legislative history of that section,
the pertinent amendments of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the detailed
regulation that has evolved from elastic statutory language. The volume
is, we are told, based on original research. As to the legislative history
and the content of regulation, originality was largely unnecessary. The
author seeks, however, to add a new and useful dimension to the typical
legal treatment by an empirical inquiry concerning the consequences of
enforcing the duty to bargain.
Ross' examination of the legislative history corrects a misapprehension spread by frequent quotation of a statement by Senator David I.
Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
when Senator Wagner's bill was being considered. That celebrated
statement, which indicated that the Wagner Act was not to lead to
governmental inquiry into the employer's negotiations, 2 has often been
invoked to support doubts about the legitimacy of a substantial portion
of the regulation based on section 8(5) of the NLRA.3 But Mr. Ross
reminds us that the Senator's statement ignored the contrary principles
1 Section "8(5)" and "8(a)(5)" will be used herein to connote the periods before and
after the 1947 amendments respectively.
2 Senator Walsh declared, inter alia: "When employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their representatives, all -the bill proposes to do is to escort
them to the door of the employer and say, 'Here they are, the legal representatives of
your employees.' What happens behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does

not seek to inquire into it. It anticipates that the employer will deal reasonably with the
employees, that he will be patient, but he is obliged to sign no agreements; he can say,
'Gentlemen, we have heard you and considered your proposals. We cannot comply with
your request.'; and that ends it." (Emphasis added.) 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935).
3 See pp. 89-96, citing inter alia, CED INDEPENDENT STUDY GROUP, THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 81-82 (1961); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAV.

L. REV. 1401-02, 1406-07 (1958); Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the
National Labor Relations Board, 63 HAsv. L. REv. 389 (1950). Ross' criticism of Cox is,

however, overdrawn; Cox in his later article recognized the ambivalence of the legislative
history, see 71 HARv. L. Rxv. 1401, 1405-07, but resolved it differently from Ross.
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developed under earlier statutes and was not representative of the
pertinent legislative history. 4 Thus, Senator Walsh himself made statements implying a larger role for government. 5 Furthermore, Senator
Wagner had declared that the duty to bargain as defined by the first
National Labor Relations Board, established on the basis of a Joint
Resolution, was to be incorporated into section 8(5).6 That Board's
reference to the settled principle that "the employer is obligated by
statute to negotiate in good faith with his employees' representatives; to
match their proposals, if unacceptable, with counter-proposals; and to
make every reasonable effort to reach an agreement," pushed the
government into the conference room and was plainly at odds with
Senator Walsh's limiting declaration. Although the same point has been
made by earlier commentators, 8 Ross' elaborate and forceful case is a
useful corrective of recent discussions that have ignored or minimized
the ambivalence of the legislative background.
Ross' exposition of Board doctrine is, on the whole, less useful than
his discussion of the legislative history. It has the quality of a pedestrian
hornbook, summarizing the law without pinpointing the difficulties that
have divided the Board, courts and commentators. It fails to consider
whether particular decisions take account of the realities, and the
diversities, of industrial relations. It fails also to identify significant
turning points in the development of regulation. It does not raise the
familiar question whether the spirit of the Supreme Court's approach
to the employer's duty has carried over into its delineation of the
reciprocal duty of the union.9 It passes over in silence recent and
controversial issues, such as the legality of Boulwareism,' 0 or the em4 Pp. 75, 83.
5 Various reasons for Senator Walsh's inconsistencies are explored in Miller, The Enigma
of Section 8(5) of the Wagner Act, 18 IND. & LAB. Rr.. REv. 166, 183-84 (1965).

6 See p. 81. But Senator Wagner had also emphasized the parties' freedom to withdraw
if their conditions were not met. See 79 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935).
7 Houde Eng'r Corp., 2 N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934). The policies of the predecessor Boards
were explained during the hearings and were not specifically questioned. See Miller, supra
note 5, at 184.
8 See BERNSTEIN, Tim NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 103-06, 129-30 (1950);
BOWMAN, PUBLIC CONTROL OF LABOR RELATIONS 118-23 (1942); Fleming, The Obligation to
Bargain in Good Faith, in PUBLIC POLICY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 60, 61-62 (Shister,
Aaron, 8: Summers eds. 1962); Findling & Colby, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by
the NLRB, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 170, 182 (1951).
9 Compare NLRB v. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958), with Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). Compare NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
(1956), and NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), with NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
10 "Boulwareism," although not easy to summarize, is an approach to collective bargaining used by General Electric that emphasizes company determination of employee
desires, company adherence to a "fair offer," and extensive company communication with
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ployer's duty to bargain about decisions with respect to "subcontracting" in its multifarious forms," plant relocation or the sale of assets.
Similarly, there is not a word about such issues as the legality of lockouts
and related bargaining pressures condemned by the Board but recently
legalized by the Supreme Court.' 2 Mr. Ross has described, rather than
analyzed, the Board's administration of sections 8(5) and 8(a)(5). Given
the difficult issues involved, the dearth of dissent or doubt in a seventy
page treatment is striking.
His acquiescence may result from his primary interest, which is in the
effect of Board doctrines. He sought by empirical investigation to
answer this question: "What is the practical meaning of the duty to
bargain?"'13 He accordingly examined all meritorious section 8(a)(5)
cases filed in seven regions during 1960,14 consisting of five cases that led
to a formal Board order and sixty-seven cases that were informally
settled. Mr. Ross unfortunately does not name or cite the cases that led
to a formal order or explain that omission, which obviously hampers a
check of his methods.
His discussion of those five cases suggests that in three of them the
enforcement of section 8(a)(5) might have protected a union with
majority support and might have led to a collective bargaining agreement; in two of them, enforcement did not produce an agreement. In
the first group, two of the cases involved violations of section 8(a)(3) as
well as section 8(a)(5). Hence, it is not clear whether the enforcement of
the former section, coupled with the power of the union (the Teamsters
in one case) might have led to, or have preserved, agreement through
collective bargaining.' 5 In any event, the conclusion, that the enforcement of section 8(a)(5) sometimes leads to (or is followed by) a collective
bargaining relationship and sometimes does not, is not surprising.
Ross' examination of the sixty-seven settlements and the subsequent
short-run bargaining history persuades him that the filing of refusal to
employees concerning the company's employment policies. See General Elec. Co., 150
N.L.R.B. No. 36, 57 L.R.R.M. 1491 (Dec. 16, 1964); cf. NORTHRUP, BOULWAREISAT (1964);
Note, "Boulwareism": Legality and Effect, 76 HARV. L. REv. 807 (1963).
11 See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Note, Employer's
Duty to Bargain About Subcontracting and Other "Management" Decisions, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 294 (1964).
12 See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278 (1965).
13 P. 182.
14 P. 183.
15 One of those cases indicates that employers with long established bargaining relationships .may violate § 8(a)(5) by proposing a package designed to "remove the union as
an effective representative of the employees." P. 189. The Board's approach to such cases
underscores the familiar tension between good faith bargaining and freedom of contract,
a tension that Ross does not squarely confront.
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bargain charges usually induces the charged employer to engage in good
faith bargaining. He urges, moreover, that the effectiveness of the
bargaining duty is shown by the fact that in only thirteen cases (19%)
was a collective bargaining relationship not established or resumed,
The significance of that figure, as Ross acknowledges,' depends on the
forces at work in individual situations. An important variable in those
situations was, of course, whether they involved a newly established
union or an established bargaining relationship. Although Ross indicates the number of cases falling in each of those categories,1s he fails to
pinpoint the percentage of new relationships covered by agreements
reached after the Board's machinery was invoked. Since new relationships are likely to be more fragile than established ones, that omission
may result in an overstatement of the effectiveness of the Board's
machinery.
There are, moreover, other difficulties in assessing Ross' overall
statistics. Some of the cases involved elusive issues, such as the legality of
unilateral action in the context of established bargaining relationships, 9
while others involved outright refusals to recognize a majority union.
The invocation of Board machinery in the latter group of cases is more
likely to be necessary for establishing some kind of bargaining relationship whereas in the former group of cases the Board's intervention is
likely to determine the details of, rather than the existence of, the
relationship; for established relations are likely to endure because of
mutual acceptability, the compulsion of power, and the entire range of
statutory protections. Statistics that scramble both types of cases obscure
20
that vital point.
A second difficulty with Ross' assessment of the settled cases arises
from the variety of charges they involved. Thus, in addition to charges
based on section 8(a)(5), those cases dealt with charges based on sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). Furthermore, some of those cases also involved strikes
and violence. As already suggested, Ross' assessment of the operational
significance of section 8(a)(5) was, accordingly, complicated by the
formidable problem of separating the impact of that section from the
impact of the rest of the statute and the economic power resulting from
P. 183.
17 Ibid.
18 P. 184.
16

19 Ibid.

In connection with the different impact of the duty to bargain on new and established
relationships, it is worth noting that commentators, who questioned the Board's expansion
of the bargaining duty and who in turn are criticized by Ross, would have read § 8(5) as
at least requiring recognition of unions with majority support-a requirement that usually
is of significant assistance to newly established unions. See Cox, The Duty To Bargain in
Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1409, 1413-14 (1958).
20
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legally protected organization. The author, although aware of that
difficulty, 21 appears consistently to understate it.
An additional difficulty with the author's assessment is that the "practical meaning of the duty to bargain" cannot be determined by focusing
exclusively on cases involving breach of that duty. That difficulty the
author ultimately highlights, as a general proposition, 22 but he nowhere
takes account of the constraints imposed on law-abiding companies who
adjust or seek to adjust their behavior so as to meet the uncertain and
fluctuating demands of the law. A determination of the elusive "practical meaning" of any law plainly calls for an inquiry into the burdens
imposed on good men, as well as the sanctions visited on evil-doers.
Such a determination in the context of the duty to bargain should
confront the following questions, among others: What burdens has
section 8(a)(5) (as distinguished from union power) imposed on management's seeking to relocate, to sell out, to buy instead of make components, to reduce "excessive wages," to protect confidential information, and generally, to work out with the union arrangements responsive
to distinctive operational needs? Furthermore, it is necessary to consider whether nonmeritorious charges of violations of section 8(a)(5)
have been exploited as tactical maneuvers and whether such exploitation has been encouraged by the looseness and instability of Board
doctrine. 23 Finally, the expansion and the refinement of the bargaining
duty has naturally added to the Board's overloaded and slow-moving
docket. Hence, assessment should also confront the issue of whether the
Board's regulation of the details of the bargaining process in situations
where overall good faith existed and, indeed, comprehensive agreement
resulted, has not diverted time and energy from essential statutory
purposes to peripheral matters. Unfortunately, Ross' search for the
"practical meaning" neglects the foregoing issues.
In his "Evaluation of the Duty to Bargain," with which he concludes
his work, Ross goes beyond the statistics of Board cases in examining the
21 P. 262.

P. 265.
Ross reports that in the twelve year period of the Wagner Act the percentage of
nonmerit charges was 55.4, whereas for the fiscal year 1962 the corresponding percentage
was about 69; furthermore, he implies that there has been a similar increase in nonmerit
charges of violation of § 8(a)(5). P. 250. He also finds that since the enactment of the
Wagner Act, there has been a fundamental acceptance of legal requirements by the employers. Pp. 251, 254, 262. Hence, any increase in nonmeritorious § 8(a)(5) charges would
appear to reflect the increased complexity of the law, a greater willingness of unions
deliberately to exploit § 8(a)(5) charges as bargaining maneuvers, or the application of
more stringent standards of proof. Ross, however, treats -the foregoing figures as indicating
a greater degree of employer compliance. Although I do not dispute that conclusion, the
change in proportion of meritorious cases scarcely supports it.
22
23
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objections that have been urged against the Board's approach. He notes
first the "inconsistency in the objections that the duty to bargain not
only is ineffective but also constitutes an overly effective intervention in
the collective bargaining process. '24 He recognizes, however, that the
inconsistency is only apparent in that "it is logically possible to assert
that the ineffectiveness of the duty to bargain can only be remedied by
...greater and greater government regulation of the substantive terms
of collective bargaining." 25 In rejecting the alleged ineffectiveness, he
points to the great increase in union membership in the several years
following the enactment of the Wagner Act.26 While acknowledging

that many forces contributed to that increase, he asserts that his previous
empirical examination "broadly speaking" leads to the conclusion that
it was the impact of the NLRB that induced compliance with public
27

policy.

Such reliance on the whole statute in the context of an appraisal of
section 8(a)(5) involves a confusing shift of focus. There is, of course, no
reason to doubt that the NLRB (and the courts) induced compliance.
But that conclusion tells us very little about the impact of section 8(a)(5)
or of the currently expansive duty derived from it. In this connection, it
is worth noting that the early surge in union membership occurred
prior to the Board's generous expansion of the duty to bargain. And it
also is worth noting that Ross recognizes that the statutory protection
28
and remedies against discrimination have been "the heart of the Act."
But he also tells us that "the duty to bargain, with all its implications, is
the heart of the public policy." 29 Perhaps this apparent inconsistency
can be explained away on the ground that the principal objective of
regulation was the promotion of collective bargaining. Nevertheless,
that explanation does not avoid the difficulty of separating the effect of
section 8(a)(5) from that of other statutory protections that appear to be
critical to the establishment and preservation of union representation
and collective bargaining.
Ross' attempt to surmount that difficulty by recourse to empirical
evidence is not convincing. He points, first, to evidence that certified
unions succeed in getting contracts in the vast majority of cases.8 0 But
plainly it is the entire statute and not merely the bargaining section
that helps prevent the dissipation of union support after, as well as prior
P. 235.
Ibid.
26 P. 238.
27 p. 239.
28 p. 242.
29 P. 262.
30 P. 251.
24

25
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to, certification. He relies also on the rise and decline of foremen's
unions. His argument appears to be supported by the temporal relationship between the Board's doctrinal changes and increased unionization
of foremen. The Board had, at one time, granted foremen all the
statutory protections except those flowing from section 8(5).3 1 After the
Board had eliminated that exception and had required employers to
bargain in good faith with foremen's unions,32 the Foremen's Association enjoyed a sharp increase in membership. 33 But several considerations underscore the need for caution both in drawing causal inferences
from the foremen's experience and in applying that experience to the
rank and file. Thus, although relying on Larrowe's study,34 Ross does
not mention his finding that the successes of the Foremen's Association
in collective bargaining were less impressive than its membership
gains.3 5 Larrowe's study also reports that membership in foremen's
unions doubled in the year after the NLRB had denied foremen any
statutory protection. 3 Plainly, the enforcement of section 8(5) was only
one of the important variables affecting the fortunes of those unions.
Other considerations also deserve attention in appraising the general
significance of the rise and decline of foremen's unions. It was an article
of management's faith that foremen were part of management and
should not be unionized. Consequently, in order to achieve and stabilize
a new employer consensus, it was especially important that unionization
of, and collective bargaining for, foremen should have been given a
clear legal and moral mandate. Plainly, such a mandate could not be
derived from the Board's internal division and shifting positions.
Despite the difficulty of generalizing from the tangled history of
foremen's organizations, it seems clear that their loss of statutory protection was a critical cause of the decline of their unions. But it does not
follow that their loss of rights under section 8(5), as distinguished from
their loss of the whole bundle of statutory protections, was crucial. The
history of foremen's unions is even less persuasive with reference to
Ross' principal contention that section 8(a)(5), as "currently interpreted," is a major factor in the preservation of collective bargaining
for nonsupervisory employees.
Beyond those questions of historical interpretation are deeper difficulties. Ross tends to treat both "collective bargaining" and "the duty to
31 See Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 348 (1944); Larrowe, A Meteor on the Industrial Relations Horizon: The Foremen's Association of America, 2 LABOR HISTORY 259, 282-84 (1961).
32 Packard Motor Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 64 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1945), afJ'd, Packard Motor Co.
v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (four Justices dissenting).
33 Pp. 261-62; Larrowe, op. cit. supra note 31, at 286.
34 P. 260 n.58.
35 Larrowe, supra note 31, at 286.
36 Id. at 277-79.
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bargain" as monolithic terms. As a consequence, his appraisal, like his
empirical inquiry, does not confront the problems raised either by the
mushrooming of regulatory detail or by specific components of regulation, such as the line of cases requiring bargaining before certain business decisions are made.3 7 Those cases raise the question whether the
existing law should be used, or should be modified, to create what may
loosely be viewed as a system of codetermination in this country. The
effect of current doctrine, as distinguished from that of economic power,
in imposing such a system is a difficult question, and there is a substantial risk that preoccupation with legal puzzles may obscure the deep
seated tendency of established unions, legal compulsion on employers
aside, to expand their challenge to managerial control. But insofar as
the law governing bargaining affects the area of joint discussions or
decisions, the law has implications for industry's capacity to respond to
change and to provide fuller employment and for the union's capacity
to protect its constituents and its institutional interests against the shock
of change. Thus, the law of bargaining impinges on large issues, such as
the structure and efficiency of industry and the allocation of the burdens
of change. Ross' appraisal does not even articulate such issues even
though they lie behind a good deal of the controversy that swirls around
the NLRB.
Nor does he deal adequately with the tensions between the Board's
elaborate regulations and the underlying statutory objective of promoting a system of private decision making.38 It is true that Senator
Walsh's limiting ordinance could scarcely have been observed if the
integrity of the representation process and the duty to recognize the
majority representative were to be supported by law, as distinguished
from union power. It is also true that once the negotiating room is
opened to government regulation there is no clear stopping point. But
the familiar difficulty of drawing lines scarcely warrants uncritical
acceptance of either each new administrative marking or the total
mass of regulation that has evolved. On the contrary, that difficulty
coupled with the parthogenetic quality of each new rule is, or should be,
a reminder of the risk that regulation may obstruct or smother the
process that it purports to safeguard. That danger has, as Ross recognizes, moved a roster of responsible critics, generally sympathetic to
collective bargaining and the union movement, to call for the total
elimination of the duty to bargain. Ross dismisses their criticism somewhat cavalierly. He implies that their concern makes sense only if, like
some die-hard employers of the thirties, they are against collective
37 See authorities cited note 11 supra.

38 See Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAiv. L. REV. 1401, 1416; Wellington,
Freedom of Contract and the Collective BargainingAgreement, 14 LAB. L.J. 1016 (1963).
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bargaining. That not so oblique ad hominem begs such important
questions as whether the existing body of regulation is compatible with

the diverse needs of an infinite variety of bargaining relationships, with
the need for regulation that is and appears to be even-handed and
reasonably predictable, and with an enterprise system that still depends
on the discipline of the market. Ross, without confronting such questions, concludes that the Board's bargaining rules are workable and have
not imposed "undue strain." 40 Plainly, so general an endorsement, unsupported by pertinent empirical or analytical considerations, is only a
statement of personal faith.
Mr. Ross has usefully reminded us that analysis and appraisal should
grapple with the operational consequences of doctrine, and, what is less
routine, has not wholly ignored his own precept. But his effort might
have been even more useful if he had paid more attention to the
problems that elude Board statistics and that are obscured by approaching "collective bargaining" and the "bargaining duty" as if they were
simple unitary concepts. On that level of abstraction, a love affair with
the Board is easy, and Ross has fallen hard. Love for an object of study
is pleasant but for a long time has not been considered helpful to
analytical work.
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